中文摘要：

以2005至2012年间曾经被出示过非标意见的251家公司为样本,本文从不同的角度对审计意见的决策有用性进行了研究,实证检验了审计意见对经理薪酬契约的影响。我们发现,就整体来说,审计意见越好,经理的薪酬业绩敏感度越高,不过审计意见的这种影响作用仅在内部监督机制较弱同时具有较高审计需求的国有企业中存在,而在民营企业中则并不明显。进一步的研究还显示,在法制环境相对完善的地区,审计意见对经理薪酬业绩敏感度产生了显著影响,而在法制环境相对落后的地区则并不存在这种关系,究其原因,可能是良好的法制环境有利于保持审计服务的独立性,因此审计意见对薪酬契约的影响也更明显。

英文摘要：

Taking 251 companies which have received nonstandard opinions during the period from 2005 to 2012, this paper studies the use of audit opinion in different view, empirically tests the impact of audit opinion on manager compensation. We find that the pay-performance sensitivity is nigher when the opinion is better, but this effect only exists in state-owned enter- prise which has a higher audit demand, and it does not exist in private enterprise which has a better internal supervision mecha- nism. The further research shows that the audit opinion has an obvious effect on pay-performance sensitivity in the area where legal environment is perfect, but in the area where legal environment is backward, this effect is not prominent. The reason of this phenomenon may be that a good legal environment conducive to independent audit service, so the influence of audit opin- ion on compensation contract is much more obvious.