中文摘要：

基于内部因素成长理论与双重委托代理分析框架，以2007-2011年中国民营中小上市公司的平衡面板数据为样本，探讨高管股权激励对民营中小企业成长的影响机理，结果表明：高管股权激励能够有效抑制股东与管理层之间的第一类代理成本，但对于由控股股东与中小股东利益冲突而形成的第二类代理成本并没有显著影响；同时第一类代理成本在高管股权激励与民营中小企业成长之间具有显著的中介效应，即股权激励以抑制第一类代理成本为影响路径对民营中小企业成长产生促进效应，但第二类代理成本的中介效应并未显现。

英文摘要：

Based on the enterprise growth theory and double agency analysis frame , this paper uses a balanced panel data of 2007-2011 of China＇s small and medium-sized private listed companies for empirical tests on the relationship between exec-utive equity incentive , double agency cost and company growth .It is found that executive equity incentive has indeed a nega-tive effect on Agency Cost I , but it cannot influence Agency Cost II significantly .Meanwhile, equity incentives can promote the growth of private listed SMEs , but this is achieved by the entire mediation effect of Agency Cost I , the mediation effect of agency Cost II is not obvious .