中文摘要：

公司债权人治理效应的发挥，依赖于负债融资的特征和债权人的监督、干预行为对公司治理产生的外部性作用。重点关注金融关联这一非正式制度安排对民营公司债权人外部性治理效应产生的影响。选取2009～2012年民营上市公司面板数据为研究样本，分析民营公司债权z．~l-部性治理效应及金融关联的调节作用。研究发现，短期借款对代理成本的外部性治理效应显著，而长期借款却椎升了民营上市公司的代理成本；金融关联能够稀释短期借款的治理作用，而在长期借款与代理成本的关系中却未表现出显著的调节效应。

英文摘要：

The governance effect of creditors relies on the characteristics of debt financing and the external function of creditors＇ supervision and intervention behaviors on corporate governance. The paper mainly analyzes the influence of financial connection, a popular unofficial institutional arrangement, on creditors＇ governance externalities effect in private enterprises. Panel data from private listed companies from 2009 to 2012 are chosen as samples to analyze the adjustment function of creditors＇ governance externalities in private companies and financial connection. Research finds out that short - term borrowings have significant influence on the governance externalities effect of agency cost, while long - term borrowings increase the agency cost of private listed companies. Financial connection can ease the governance function of short -term borrowing, but it has insignificant adjustment effect in the relationship between longterm borrowing and agency cost.