中文摘要：

在借鉴西方相关研究的同时，中国学者忽略了自身资本市场的特点，即实际控制人的存在可能导致上市公司信息披露缺乏自主性。虽然部分母子公司治理研究关注到了母公司对子公司的干预和控制，但是忽略了子公司的自主性以及母子公司间的互动性，导致现有研究陷入“母公司单向治理”的窠臼。旨在完善现有母子公司治理研究．本文分析了“母公司单向治理”视角的不足。并以沪深两市上市公司作为研究样本．验证了基于“双向治理”研究视角的子公司信息披露理论框架的合理性。证实了母公司对子公司信息披露控制的差异性，以及母公司与子公司在信息披露方面互动的存在性。研究结论说明．相较于第一类代理问题，第二类代理问题在中国资本市场上市公司中更为严重。鉴此．本文提出了法律法规、母公司和子公司三个层面的、旨在弱化第二类代理问题对子公司信息披露影响的相关政策建议。

英文摘要：

Based on the advanced idea and methodology of western countries＇ corporate governance research, Chinese scholars neglected the unique charecteristics of Chinese capital market, which is that the existence of controlling shareholders leads to a different context for listed companies＇ information disclosure. If Chinese scholars would not take the unique charecteristics of Chinese capital market into consideration, it would be harmful for finding the proper paths to solve the problems. Although previous research noted that parent company would like to impose control on the subsidiary, the autonomy of subsidiary and the interaction between parent and subsidiary were ignored, which led the previous research to parent company＇s ＂one-way＂ governance. This paper introduced parent-subsidiary＇s ＂two-way＂ governance perspective, so that to perfect current framework of parent-subsidiary governance, and analyzed the defficiency of parent company＇s ＂one-way＂ governance. Then, based on parent- subsidiary＇s ＂two-way＂ governance perspective, we find that the contingency of parent company＇s control and the existence of bargaining process between parent and subsidiary. Additionally, with regard to type I agency cost, type II agency cost is more serious in Chinese listed companies. This paper offers related suggestions, involving legislation, parent company＇s controlling behaviors and subsidiary＇s governance, to alleviate the influence of tiype II agency cost on subsidiary＇s information disclosure.