中文摘要：

研究了期限错配情形下融资平台债务展期对银行预期收益的影响,以及银行的管理激励和行为模式。主要结论或启示：①对期限错配平台债务进行展期安排符合银行的利益诉求,银行有激励对有关债务＂一展到底＂;②银行可通过承担适度项目经营风险的方式获得更大的预期收益,且平台项目的自有资本金比例越高,银行从越长期限的债务展期中获得的预期收益越大;③分配项目增长红利的展期重构策略不具有理论上的适当性,对期限错配平台债务而言,若仅基于已到期债务和展期债务的正常本息偿付而对之进行展期将更合乎银行的需要。

英文摘要：

The paper studies the influential mechanism of financing platform debt extension on banks＇ expected profits,as well as the managerial incentives and behavior modes.The primary conclusions or implications include：（i）the longer the extension of platform debts,the bigger of bank＇s expected profit,implying that the bank has an intrinsic incentive to extend matured platform debts over or to their construction period;（ii）a bank can obtain greater profit by taking modest project operational risk,and the higher the proportion of registered project capital,the bank can obtain greater expected profit from a longer period of debt extension;（iii）the debt restructuring mode of participating and allocating project＇s growth option in extendible period does not have its theoretical appropriateness for banks.It will be more desirable for banks to extend platform debt with maturity mismatch only for recovering the normal principal and interest repayment.