中文摘要：

本文研究了应急资本参与者在限制银行风险承担中的作用及其条件依赖性。研究表明，在适当的资本区间内，应急资本债权人有市场约束激励，同时银行股东有动机限制其更大的风险承担／转移倾向。从管控银行风险承担的视角来看，监管当局有引入应急资本工具（或嵌入转股条款的创新型资本工具）的必要性和适当性，但须基于不同银行资本水平的差异进行结构性设计和区别对待。监管当局可允许或强制高资本银行发行一定规模的应急资本，但对低资本银行而言，应在其申报的资本补充和增长计划的评估基础上，审慎核准其应急资本的发行资格和发行规模。

英文摘要：

This paper studies the roles that the relevant stakeholders play in limiting risk - taking/transferring behavior of banks. There exists parameter interval within which contingent capital can limit the risk - taking/ transferring behavior of banks. It is necessary and appropriate for the regulatory authorities to introduce contingent capital or innovative hybrid capital instruments with conversion terms to limit the risk - taking of banks. Regulatory authorities may allow or force the high - capital banks to issue a certain amount of contingent capital, but prudently approve the issue qualification and issue size of contingent capital once low - capital banks apply for capital replenishment.