中文摘要：

国有企业和地方融资平台在一定程度上都受政府隐性担保，政府隐性担保是否会因两者之间的不同而发生变化，进而产生不同的影响？通过对2007—2012年上市债券的研究，我们发现，政府隐l性担保降低了国有企业债券的风险，却增加了地方融资平台债券的风险。我们还发现，信用评级越低，政府隐性担保越能降低国有企业债券的风险，相反，信用评级越高，政府隐性担保越能增加地方融资平台债券的风险。不同于国有企业，政府帮助地方融资平台取得债务资金，隐性担保的方式发生了变化，损害了债权人的利益。

英文摘要：

State-owned enterprises and local financing platform both have government implicit guarantee. Are there different from their government implicit guarantee？ And does their government implicit guarantee have dif- ferent influence on their financing cost？ Based on the investigation about the corporate bonds listed during 2007 -2012, we find that government implicit decreases state -owned enterprises bonds＇ risk, but increases local financing platform bonds＇ risk. We also find that government implicit decreases more state - owned enter- prises bonds＇ risk when bond rating is lower, and government implicit increases more local financing platform bonds＇ risk when bond rating is higher. There is different from state - owned enterprises. Governments illegally help local financing platform get capital. This hardly hurt creditors＇ benefits. Our results suggest that we should strip local financing platforms＇ financing function off.