中文摘要：

本文研究管理层持股是否对债券投资者有利。通过对2008-2013年证券交易所债券发行数据进行研究,我们发现,管理层持股比例越高,发行担保债券的可能性越低,因为担保债券会对管理层形成监督效应,限制其投机主义的自利行为,导致管理层不倾向于发行担保债券。我们还发现,管理层持股比例越高,债券的发行利差越大,因为管理层持股导致其风险偏好上升,增加了债券投资者的风险。由此我们得到的启示是,与管理层持股增加股东利益不同,管理层持股会加剧管理层与债券投资者之间的利益冲突,持股的管理层会侵犯债券投资者利益。

英文摘要：

Management ownership is beneficial to share-holders as everyone knows, is it also beneficial to bond investors？Based on the investigation about bond issues during 2008-2013, we find the possibilities of issuing guaranteed bonds are higher when managements hold more ownership. That＇s because guaranteed bonds would limited managements＇ self-interest behavior, managements don＇t want to issue guaranteed bonds. We also find that bond issuing spreads are bigger when managements hold more ownership. That＇s because management ownership make their risk preference increase, and it increases bond investors＇ risks. Our results suggest that it is different from share-holders, share-holding managements would infringe bond investors＇ interests.