中文摘要：

本文研究了数量柔性契约下服务供应链的最优激励机制问题。运用连续工作表现的道德风险模型,构建了服务供应链激励模型,得出最优的激励转移支付,并详细分析了数量柔性契约下供应商需要努力的必要性条件、不同激励程度的机制设计以及不同谈判力要求下的激励机制控制等。研究认为：①在数量柔性契约中,只有特定需求分布的服务供应链才能提供有效的供应商激励机制;②最优激励机制存在一个震荡间断点;③可通过改变参数来调整激励程度并调整成员间的利润分配。

英文摘要：

This paper studies the optimal incentive mechanism for service supply chain based on the quantity flexibility contract.Based on the model of moral hazard under continuous working performance,it sets up the incentive model for service supply chain,and mainly discusses the following questions： the prior condition for the supplier to offer costly effort,the mechanisms according to the different degrees of incentive, and the control mechanisms under the different requirement of bargaining power.etc.The result shows as follows：the incentive mechanism is available just in the service supply chain which complies with certain demand distribution;there is a discontinuous point on the incentive payment curve;the degree of incentive and the profit distribution among members can be modified through changing parameter values.