中文摘要：

针对政府购买公共服务的质量监控问题,从政府的最优监督分析出发,建立了基于不完全信息的3阶段博弈模型,得出了增加对违规组织的惩罚力度及减扣对采取违规行为的公共服务承接机构的保留补贴费用,可以遏制组织采取违规行为倾向的结论;同时求得政府购买公共服务过程中的最优监督水平,并以实例分析并验证了文中的结论.文中提出了切实可行的政府购买公共服务质量监控策略,为相关部门的行为决策提供借鉴.

英文摘要：

In view of the problem of public services′quality monitoring under the condition of government pro-curement,a three-stage game theory model is constructed based on incomplete information,starting from the per-spective of government′s optimal supervision.Conclusions include that raising penalties and deducting retention of subsidies for public service providers with speculative acts could contain these organizations′undue irregulari-ties to some extent.Meanwhile the optimal level of government′s supervision is obtained,and an example is giv-en to verify our conclusion.Accordingly,practicable strategies for public services′quality monitoring under gov-ernment procurement are proposed,which will provide reference for governments′decision making.