中文摘要：

运用委托代理理论构建了一个不确定条件下内生团队知识共享激励模型,分析了均衡条件下知识共享努力水平与团队协作成本、重要性系数和团队绩效激励强度之间的关系,以及团队协作重要性系数、绝对风险规避系数和不确定性程度对团队绩效最优激励强度的影响。研究表明：代理人努力成本和团队协作重要性系数满足一定条件时,对代理人激励才能促进知识共享,反之,很大的激励强度都无法促进知识共享;最优激励强度与团队协作重要性系数成正比,与代理人绝对风险规避系数和不确定性程度成反比。

英文摘要：

The model of endogenous team knowledge sharing is proposed under uncertain environment on the basis of principal-agent theory.The relationship between the knowledge sharing effort level and the cost of team collaboration,the importance of collaboration coefficient and the incentive strength,the impact by the importance of team collaboration coefficient,absolute risk aversion coefficient and the degree of uncertainty on the set of optimal incentive strength are analyzed.The results illustrate that the knowledge sharing is promoted by the principal only when the collaboration cost of efforts and the importance factor of team collaboration satisfy certain condition.The optimal incentive strength is proportional to the importance of team collaboration factor,and is inversely proportional to the agent＇s absolute risk aversion factor and the degree of uncertainty.