中文摘要：

跨期价格歧视在现实中普遍存在，很多文献研究了垄断厂商实施跨期价格歧视的动因及条件问题．本文基于Salop模型，并假设消费者在评价价值和等待成本两个维度上存在差异，分析了双寡头竞争的纵向市场结构下跨期价格歧视的问题．通过比较两种博弈的结果，得出在一定条件下“跨期价格歧视”博弈中生产商的利润大于“单一定价”博弈中生产商的利润，揭示出转售价格维持可以帮助生产商区分不同类型的消费者，实施跨期价格歧视，获得高利润，而消费者遭受损失．本文的研究结论不仅补充了跨期价格歧视和转售价格维持的理论，而且对于反垄断执法实践具有重要的参考价值．

英文摘要：

Intertemporal price discrimination is widespread in markets. Many theoretical works have studied the motives and conditions of implementing intertemporal price discrimination. Based on the Salop model, the paper analyzes intertemporal price discrimination within a vertical differentiated duopoly competition market by constructing a model which distinguishes different consumers according to evaluation value and waiting cost. The results show that manufacturers in ＇ intertemporal price discrimination＇ game obtain more profits than those in ＇uniform pricing＇ game under certain circumstances. Therefore, resale price maintenance not only helps manufacturers differentiate consumers, but also helps manufacturers implement intertemporal price discrimination which brings more profits while consumers suffer losses. The above conclusions are crucial complements to the existing theory, and may facilitate government antitrust practices.