中文摘要：

随着信息技术的发展，厂商可以根据消费者的历史购买信息实施差别定价．该文主要研究相互竞争的厂商基于消费者的购买历史实行差别定价的本质特征和形成机制，以及实施这种定价策略能否在竞争中获取竞争优势．分析结果显示，在竞争性差别定价均衡中，消费者寻求多样化购买是厂商实施差别定价的内在原因，厂商在第2期通过给予价格优惠吸引消费者重复购买，对忠诚的消费者给予奖励，并在第l期弱化竞争，导致两期竞争存在“默契合谋”，消费者寻求多样化购买成为竞争厂商利润的源泉；如果厂商能够比竞争对手率先实施差别定价的营销策略，那么就能在竞争中获取优势．另外，清晰地刻画了竞争性差别定价均衡存在且唯一的充分条件．该文的研究结果可以很好地解释现实经济中许多厂商的定价竞争策略行为，对于厂商的产品营销战略具有重要的指导意义．

英文摘要：

As the information technology develops, firms can tract consumers＇ purchase history and carry out price discriminations based on those information. In this paper, we investigate how such information can be u- tilized by firms in a dynamic （two-stage） duopoly model. We show that consumer＇ s variety seeking behavior is the main reason for the firms to discriminate consumers. Specifically, firms need to charge loyal consumers a lower price and therefore, a larger market share in the first period is relatively less attractive. As a result, the first period competition is alleviated which leads to ＂tacit collusion＂. This shows that consumers＇ variety seeking behavior is the source of firms＇ profits. We also provide a sufficient condition for the existence and u- niqueness of the equilibrium. In addition, we show that a firm, who can engage in price discrimination, can gain advantages if his opponent cannot. Our dustry and membership （discount） cards in product marketing strategies. findings provide explanations for frequent flyer plans in airline in- retail stores. The results have important implications in firms＇