中文摘要：

本文将商业信用视为承诺机制，探讨了资本化研究开发支出与商业信用供给之间的关系。研究结果表明，资本化研究开发支出越高，越需要商业信用供给作为一种媒介来起到承诺作用，抑制上游企业的机会主义行为。同时研究发现，资本化研究开发支出与商业信用的正相关关系在非国有企业中不显著而在国有企业中显著。文章进一步地分析产品市场竞争在上述关系中的调节作用，发现在国有企业中随着产品市场竞争激烈程度的增加，资本化研究开发支出与商业信用之阊的关系得以强化。最后文章分析国有企业的资金需求是否会对产品市场竞争的调节作用产生影响，回归结果表明资金需求大的时候，调节作用显著，而资金需求较小时，未观察到显著影响。

英文摘要：

This paper views trade credit as a commitment mechanism and explores the relationship between development expenditures and trade credit supply. The results show that the higher development expenditure, the more need for trade credit supply as a commitment mechanism,which can inhibit opportunistic behavior of upstream business. Meanwhile the research finds that the positive correlation between development expenditure and trade credit is not significant in nonstate-owned enterprises but significantly in state-owned enterprises. The paper further analyzes the role of product market competition in the above relationship and finds that as the product market competition intensity increases, the relationship between development expenditure and trade credit will be strengthened for the state-owned enterprises. Finally, the paper analyzes whether the funding needs of state-owned enterprises have an impact on the moderating effect of product market competition. Regression results show that when a demand for funds is large, a significant moderating effect. When funding needs is small, the moderating effect is not significant.