中文摘要：

基于多任务委托代理并结合工程项目特点,以拓展型Cobb-Douglas生产函数反映工期、成本和质量多任务努力投入情况下工程项目的产出,构建了业主与承包商激励模型.结果表明,承包商在工期、成本和质量任务上的最优努力水平与综合技术水平正相关,与各自任务的边际努力成本变化率负相关;业主对承包商的最优激励系数一方面受承包商自身因素影响,包括承包商的综合技术水平、绝对风险规避度以及边际努力成本变化率,另一方面取决于项目不同任务的重要性及所处环境的不确定性.研究结果有助于业主选择适当的激励强度并实现合理的风险分担.

英文摘要：

Considering the characteristics of construction projects,a multi-task incentive model between the owner and contractor was established based on the principal-agent theory. An extended form of Cobb-Douglas production function was built to reflect the outcome of construction projects in the circumstances of multi-dimensional efforts invested in schedule,cost and quality. Results indicate that the optimal amount of effort devoted to each of the three tasks is positively associated with the total factor productivity,and negatively associated with the marginal changing rate of cost-of-effort. Besides,the optimal incentive coefficient is influenced by two kinds of factors： one is related to the contractor,including the total factor productivity,absolute risk-aversion coefficient,and the marginal changing rate of cost-of-effort; the other is related to the significance of each task and the uncertainty of the circumstances. Our research results could help the owner select appropriate incentive intensity and achieve reasonable risk sharings.