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城市地下工程核心安全风险治理：多方协同策略的形成与演化

ISSN号：1000-131X
期刊名称：《土木工程学报》
时间：0
分类：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]
作者机构：[1]天津大学,天津300072, [2]天津轨道交通集团有限公司,天津300392
相关基金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目（71231006）、国家自然科学基金（71172148）和中国太平洋财产保险股份有限公司天津分公司委托项目

关键词：城市地下工程, 核心安全风险, 协同治理, 演化博弈, urban underground engineering, core safety risk, collaborative governance, evolutionary game theory

中文摘要：

多方协同治理是实现城市地下工程核心安全风险管控的重要途径，然而风险管控主要参与方基于有限理性的决策阻碍了协同治理效应的形成。为探究主要参与方在收益联动下的合理策略选择，本文引入演化博弈研究方法依次构建了“发包人一承包人一保险人”的三方博弈模型，在全局视角下分析了三方不同风险管控参与策略及两方不同知识共享策略的支付矩阵，推演出不同策略组合的渐进趋势。研究表明：在三方博弈关系中，发包人主动管控核心安全风险、承包人积极管控核心安全风险、保险人参与管控核心安全风险是各方的演化稳定策略。基于上述研究结论，从强化风险共管的协同治理理念、固化“三元主体”的治理结构及优化风险治理激励手段二个方面提出了风险协同治理机制设计的相关建议。

英文摘要：

Multi-party collaborative governance is an important way to control the core safety risks of urban underground engineering. However, the decision-making results of the main participants in risk control and management based on bounded rationality have hindered the formation of collaborative governance. In order to explore the reasonable strategy choices of the main participants with related payoff, the evolutionary game research method was adopted in this work to construct the three-party game model of ＇Owner-Contractor-Insurance Company＇. From the overall perspective, the payoff matrices of three-party different risk control strategies and two-party different knowledge sharing strategies were analyzed, and the gradual trends of different strategy combinations were deduced. The research shows that ： in the three- party game model, active management of the core safety risks from owner, positive management of the core safety risks from contractor and participating of insurance company in the management of the core safety risks result in the evolutionary stable strategies of all parties. Based on the above conclusions, some suggestions on risk collaborative governance mechanism, including strengthening risk collaborative governance, solidifying governance structure of ‘three elements＇ and optimizing risk governance incentives, are provided.

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