中文摘要：

通过对1999—2009的11718个被收购公司样本进行分组比较后发现掏空程度高的样本组公司业绩更差．全体样本被收购前的掏空程度显著高于被收购后的掏空程度，说明这些上市公司被收购后的掏空行为得到了收敛．掏空程度最低的样本组被收购时给股东带来的财富效应是负的，而掏空程度最高的样本组被收购后给股东带来的财富效应是正的．通过回归分析，发现控制权与现金流权的分离度越大，掏空对业绩的负面影响更大；大股东受到的制衡度越小，掏空对业绩的负面影响越小；被收购前如果董事长与总经理两职合一，那么被收购后因改善掏空而获得的财富效应将弱化；目标公司在被收购前的控制权与现金流权的分离度越大，目标公司被收购时获得的财富效应越小．

英文摘要：

Based on 11 718 acquisition events data during 1999 -2009 in Chinese listed companies, the posi-tive study results show that the severer the tunneling behavior, the worse the performance of the company. Tunneling of all samples prior to the acquisition is significantly higher than that after the acquisition , indica-ting the behavior of tunneling of these listed companies weakened after the acquisition. The group with the low-est level of tunneling has a negative wealth effect of shareholders after being acquired, and the group with the highest level of tunneling has a positive wealth effect. Regression analysis found that the greater the degree of separation of control rights and cash flow rights is, the greater the negative impact of tunneling on perform-ance; the smaller the degree of restriction of the block shareholders, the smaller the negative impact of tunne-ling on performance; if the position of chairman and general manager is occupied by the same person before being acquired, the wealth effect will weaken after the acquisition to improve tunneling; the greater the degree of the separation of control rights and cash flow rights in the target company before the acquisition, the smaller the wealth effect of the target company is.