中文摘要：

以批发价契约与回购契约为例,分析与比较风险规避型供应链分别采取Stackelberg博弈和Nash讨价还价博弈时的最优化决策,探讨供应链主导方如何根据合作伙伴的风险规避水平选择契约与博弈机制。研究表明,当零售商与供应商风险规避水平相同时,供应链的最优选择是采用Nash讨价还价博弈的批发价契约或者回购契约,二者等价;当零售商与供应商风险规避水平比较接近时,采用Nash讨价还价博弈下的回购契约要优于相同博弈机制下的批发价契约;当零售商与供应商风险规避水平相差较大时,供应商不会选择Nash讨价还价博弈下的任一契约,而是选择Stackelberg博弈下的回购契约。与风险中性假设下的结论相比,风险规避下的研究结论更符合供应链管理实践。

英文摘要：

The study analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under the wholesale price contract and the buyback contract when the risk-averse partners take Stackelberg game and Nash bargaining model.It aims to explore the supply chain leader＇s choice of contract and game mechanism according to the risk-averse levels of partners.The results show that,1when the retailer and supplier have the same level of risk-aversion,the best choice is the wholesale contract or buyback contract based on Nash bargaining model,both contracts are equivalent;2when the retailer＇s risk-averse level is close to the supplier＇s,the buyback contract based on Nash bargaining model is better than the wholesale price contract with the same game mechanism;3when the difference of risk-averse level between the supplier and the retailer is large,the supplier will not choose any contract under the cooperation game,but choose the buyback contract under the Stackelberg game.The conclusion of this study is more consistent with the practice of supply chain management than that of risk-neutral hypothesis.