中文摘要：

我国地方政府债务客观上存在权责分离,这意味着债务权力难以受到债务责任的有效约束,如果出现地方政府＂经济人＂利益诱导,地方政府债务将超越社会利益范畴而出现超常规增长。可见,权责分离为地方政府债务超常规增长创造了条件,同时这种超常规增长还取决于不同政绩利益环境下的地方政府利益行为选择。实证检验发现,权责分离加剧了基于追求经济增长预期和应对人员支出压力对地方政府债务增长的影响,主要表现为债务违约。进一步检验发现,权责分离对债务超常规增长的影响还取决于地方政府＂经济人＂利益强度,这与上级政府补助引起的支出独立性存在负相关,即上级补助越多,支出独立性越弱,对债务依赖越小;与政府官员晋升激励存在正相关,即在＂唯GDP＂政绩考核模式下,周边同类地区经济水平越高,越能激发地方政府加速举债。最后,本文从改变债务权责关系、转变政府官员政绩观、优化财政分权体制等方面提出遏制地方政府债务超常规增长的相关制度措施。

英文摘要：

Objectively,there exists the separation of authority-responsibility in local government debt in China, which means that it is difficult to make debt power get constrained effectively by the debt obligations. With the induction of the ＂economic man＂ benefit for local governments, the local government debt will undergo an extraordinary growth beyond social benefit category. That is to say, separation of authority-responsibility has created conditions for the extraordinary growth of the local government debt, which is also decided by the benefit choice of the local government activity under different backgrounds of political performance. Through empirical analysis, the separation of authority-responsibility exacerbated the impact on local government debt growth which is based on the pursuit of economic growth expectations and the response of personnel expenditure pressure, and debt default is a main kind of indication. Then, from further analysis, we found that the effects on the extraordinary debt growth also depended on the strength of ＂ economic man＂ benefit of local governments, which was negatively correlated with the expenditure independence decided by subsidies from governments of high levels and had positive relation with the promotion incentive of government officials. Finally, from the perspectives of changing the relation of debt authority-responsibility, transforming the political performance concept of government officials, and optimizing fiscal decentralization system, this paper put forward related measures to curb the extraordinary growth of local government debt.