中文摘要：

从居民效用与开发商收益视角下，以Smith租差理论为基础，构建多智能体模型，并结合纳什均衡解决居民修缮决策博弈，模拟中产阶层化进程。研究表明：在效用最大时，增加居民收入将降低中产阶层化发生频率。而在利润最大时，开发商资本的投入与中产阶层化发生频率正相关。资本投入越大，中产阶层化发生频率越高。但资本并非万能，当它的投入超出限值时，中产阶层化进程渐趋稳定。提高开发商投资门槛，将强化房地产业的垄断，开发商为获取巨额垄断利润，一方面，他们可能故意提高局部地区的资本化地租，这导致了中产阶层化更快、更多地发生；另一方面，他们在任意区位开发都能获取高额利润，这间接造成中产阶层化程度下降。

英文摘要：

Numerous literature shows that gentrification can not only improve the living en- vironment, but also cause some social problems. In the background of consumer utility and developer income, this paper uses the Smith＇s rent gap theory combined with Nash e- quilibrium to construct a multi-agent system, and simulates the evolution of gentrification. The results show, firstly, in the assumption of utility maximization, the increase of real income would reduce the probability of gentrification occurrence, leading to narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor. Secondly, in the assumption of profit maximization, the evolution of gentrification depends on the amount of capital invested by developers. However, if it exceeds a threshold value, the extent of gentrification would stop increas- ing. Thirdly, the evolution of gentrification is associated with the developers＂ entrance threshold. The higher threshold of developers＂ entrance implies that developers can make higher returns in the inner-city housing market. As a result, it may raise the sale price of inner-city land to a certain degree and the frequency of gentrification and degentrification.