中文摘要：

由于契约的不完全性,风险企业控制权配置便成为风险企业治理的核心问题,但控制权配置方式会随着风险企业内外条件的变化而变化。将演化博弈方法运用到风险企业控制权配置中,在不完全契约情境下,求解风险投资家与风险企业家控制权配置方式演化的稳定策略,分析各变量对控制权配置方式的影响,并运用Matlab 7.0仿真软件,对提出的命题进行数值模拟。结果表明,博弈主体存在着两种控制权配置最优方式,即相机控制与联合控制,该结论与以前研究有所不同。同时,相机控制和联合控制的选择会受到相关变量的影响。风险企业自然经营状态好的预期概率、风险企业总收益变量均与相机控制正相关,与联合控制负相关;而风险企业的清算价值、项目成功率、风险企业家私人收益、风险投资家战略收益变量均与联合控制正相关,与相机控制负相关。最后,Matlab7.0仿真结果与提出的命题一致,进一步验证了命题。

英文摘要：

Due to the incomplete contract,the configuration for control rights becomes the core problem of corporate governance in risky corporate. With the changing of internal and external conditions,the configuration mode for control rights is not fixed. We apply the evolutionary game theory to the configurations of corporate control in risky corporate.Using incomplete contract and evolutionary game theory,we obtain the stable strategy of control configuration modes between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs,and analyze the impact of each variable on control configuration modes.By simulation with Matlab 7.0,we numerically test the proposed propositions and obtain two main optimal modes of control configuration,namely,contingency control and joint control,which is different from previous studies.Meanwhile,the choices of contingency control and joint control is affected by the relevant variables.The expected probability of operating in good state and total revenue of risky corporate are positively associated with the contingency control,and negatively associated with the joint control;liquidation value,the project success rate,the entrepreneurs＇ private income,and venture capitalists＇ strategic gains arepositively related to the joint control,and negatively related to the contingency control.These hypotheses are consistent with the propositions proposed by simulation with Matlab 7.0.