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基于在线报价与固定价格的闭环供应链最优决策研究
  • ISSN号:1003-207X
  • 期刊名称:《中国管理科学》
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:C931[经济管理—管理学]
  • 作者机构:[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074, [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072
  • 相关基金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571079,71171088,71131004,71301122,71671133);教育部新世纪人才支持基金(NCET-13-0228);中央高校基本科研业务费(HUST,CXY12M013);武汉大学自主科研项目(人文社科)
中文摘要:

本文研究闭环供应链中制造商在逆向渠道采用单一在线报价,两次在线报价和固定价格模式来回收折旧品的最优决策问题。研究表明,虽然两次报价比单一报价给消费者带来更高的期望效用,然而从制造商的利润来看,两次报价是较劣的策略。制造商选择单一报价和固定价格的回收模式,主要取决于再制造节约成本和预设价格的上限。如果预设价格的上限低于某临界值,随着节约成本增加,制造商的最优策略从固定价格转变为单一报价;如果预设价格的上限超过该临界值,制造商的最优策略一直是固定价格模式。最后,通过算例分析进一步探讨了重要参数对制造商利润的影响,揭示了制造商可以向消费者传递更低的预设价格上限来获利的管理意义。

英文摘要:

In the recycling and remanufacturing industry,used items are often recycled by aposted price(PP)mechanism.Recently,some online platforms of resource recycling also permit the seller to use the name-your-own-price(NYOP)mechanism,meaning that used items will only be recycled when the bid proposed by the seller is no larger than an opaque reserve price predetermined by the recycling agent.However,in the academic field of closed-loop supply chain,thus far,few researches have been conducted on investigating the NYOP mechanism.In this paper,it’s aimed to investigate the optimal strategies in a closed-loop supply chain under three pricing mechanisms:posted price,single-bid NYOP and double-bid NYOP when consumers can additionally propose a second bid if the first bid fails.A Stackelberg game is employed to analyze consumers’ and the manufacturer’s strategies where the latter acts as the leader and the former act as a follower.Based on the nonlinear optimization,the optimal bid for the consumer and the optimal reserve price for the recycling agent under aforementioned three pricing mechanisms are obtained.Furthermore,the optimal strategies among those three pricing mechanisms are compared in terms of profit as well.Result shows that the double-bid mechanism brings about more expected utility for consumers,however,from the perspective of the manufacturer’s profit,the double-bid NYOP mechanism is an inferior strategy.In addition,whether the manufacture adopts the single-bid NYOP mechanism or the posted price mechanism depends on saved cost due to remanufacturing activities and the upper bound of the reserve price.If the upper bound of the reserve price is lower than a certain threshold,as the saved cost increases,the optimal strategy is converted from PP mechanism to the single-bid NYOP mechanism.However,if the upper bound is higher than the threshold,PP mechanism is always the optimal strategy.Moreover,we investigate the effects of key parameters such as the ratio of green consumers on the manufacturer’

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期刊信息
  • 《中国管理科学》
  • 中国科技核心期刊
  • 主管单位:中国科学院
  • 主办单位:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会 中科院科技政策与管理科学研究所
  • 主编:蔡晨
  • 地址:北京海淀区中关村北一条15号(北京8712信箱)
  • 邮编:100190
  • 邮箱:zgglkx@casipm.ac.cn
  • 电话:010-62542629
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1003-207X
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:11-2835/G3
  • 邮发代号:82-50
  • 获奖情况:
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 日本日本科学技术振兴机构数据库,中国中国人文社科核心期刊,中国中国科技核心期刊,中国北大核心期刊(2008版),中国北大核心期刊(2011版),中国北大核心期刊(2014版)
  • 被引量:25352