中文摘要：

为了研究供应链企业间由于信息不对称而引起的委托代理问题，从供应链的核心企业——制造商的角度出发，设计出两种模型：即纯激励模型和加入了监督惩罚策略的激励监督模型。通过这两种模型的分析比较，得出了这两种模型各自的适用范围，并探讨了不同因素如分销商的成本系数、风险规避系数、外界环境的不确定性及制造商的监督成本系数对最优激励强度、最优监控强度的影响，为供应链企业间解决委托代理问题提供了一种有效的分析工具。

英文摘要：

To study the problems of principal- agent caused by asymmetric information of supply chain enterprises, this paper, from the perspective of the core enterprise——manufacturer of supply chain, designs two models： pure incentive model and incentive - monitoring model that contain both monitoring and punishing strategy. By analyzing and comparing two models, it works out the applied area of the two models. This paper also discusses some different factors, for example＇ the cost coefficient of distributor, the coefficient of risk evading, the uncertainty of environment and the monitoring cost coefficient of manufacturer, as all can influence the best incentive degree and the best monitoring degree. It offers an effective analysis tool to solve the problem of principal - agent of supply chain enterprises.