中文摘要：

存货质押贷款是解决中小企业融资难问题的主要贷款渠道,已有文献缺乏对监管人的分析。运用激励理论,拓展分析存货质押三方契约背景下物流企业提供信息服务时的激励问题。分别在卖方垄断和完全竞争两种市场结构下,构建优化模型并求解,结论是若银行对物流企业信息服务努力程度具有完全信息时,固定委托费用合同是最优激励合同;若银行具有不完全信息时,分成合同是最优激励合同;若物流企业受到有限责任约束,应采用固定委托费用合同。

英文摘要：

Inventory pledge loan is the chief fund source to solve SMF financing problem.There is a lack of analysis of the supervisor in existing literatures.With principal-agent theory,we discuss the incentive problem of logistics company information service under tripartite contract of inventory pledge loan.Under monopoly and perfect competition market equilibrium,we find the contract to realize market optimal equilibrium.We make conclusion： Creditors should use different contracts to monitor and encourage suitable logistics corporation to act for their income maximization goal.Fixed commission contract should be used under the symmetric information,and the profit sharing contract should be used when creditors have less information and the effort of logistics company is more important to creditor＇s revenue.