中文摘要：

研究表明，当制造商处于竞争性环境，而购买商具有一定的市场势力时，制造商的机会主义行为并不能使自己的利润增加，反而使购买商的销售利润增加、福利有一定的提高。因而在渠道销售中有必要区分“好”的机会主义行为和“坏”的机会主义行为，针对不同的机会主义行为采用相应的治理机制，才能够科学地保证渠道销售低交易成本运行，那种凡机会主义行为必有害、必须严厉控制的观点会适得其反，导致不必要的资源浪费和福利损失。

英文摘要：

It is thought that opportunism behaviors in dynamitic channel environment will lead the waste of resources and the loss of profits. The study shows that the opportunity behaviors in channel relations will evoke the party welfare influenced by channel partner. According to a channel marketing supermodel, Moorthy＇s conceptual framework, manufacturer opportunity behaviors, out-of-stock, don＇t bring added-benefit for themselves, on the contrary, the buyer profit increases and welfare adds, anti-intuitively. So, the opportunism should be divided into good or bad opportunisms in order to protect the trade from being disrupted. The traditional view that opportunism is harmful is not scientifical and will make things worse. Accordingly, traders should take different mechanisms under different conditions. Only so, can traders finish transaction in a way of low-transaction-cost.