中文摘要：

分别建立了只存在零售商不公平厌恶以及零售商和制造商同时存在不公平厌恶两种模型。考虑需求依赖于零售价格和制造商的质量努力水平,分别研究了以上两个模型下零售商的最优零售价格、制造商的最优批发价格和质量努力水平,以及零售商和制造商的最优利润。研究结果表明：在第一种模型下,零售价格、批发价格和质量努力水平都是关于零售商的不利不公平厌恶系数递减,对零售商来说,也不是零售商不利不公平厌恶越严重,越对自己有利。零售商的不公平厌恶行为增加了零售商的竞争能力,但也挫败了制造商进行质量努力投资的积极性。在第二种模型下,制造商的质量努力水平关于零售商的不公平厌恶程度更敏感。最后进行算例分析,并给出一些管理启示。

英文摘要：

This study aims to build the models under cases that only the retailer has the inequity aversion or both the retailer and the manufacturer have the inequity aversion,respectively.Considering the demand depends on the retail price and the manufacturer＇s quality effort level,we investigate the retailer＇s optimal retail price,the manufacturer＇s optimal wholesale price and quality effort level,and the optimal profits of the retailer and the manufacturer under above two models.The results show that all the retail price,the wholesale price and the quality effort level decrease with the disadvantageous inequity aversion coefficient,the retailer＇s inequity aversion behavior not only increases the competitive power of the retailer with the manufacturer,but also frustrates the enthusiasm of the manufacturer to invest on the quality effort.A numerical example is given in the end,and some managerial implications are derived.