中文摘要：

针对大量现实博弈与Nash均衡预测相背离的现象，抛开“共同理性”假设，提出了Nash均衡理论的另一个隐性前提“博弈的封闭性假设”，进而引入“潜在参与人”的概念，扩展了博弈参与人的范围，从理论上指出开放环境下策略偏离者的支付增益可能导致博弈结果偏离原Nash均衡；然后举例说明，将随机扰动引入标准复制子动态，对一个两阶段重复囚徒博弈偏离预期均衡的原因进行剖析；最后基于CAS理论和多主体系统的建模思想，应用仿真实验进一步分析和验证了以上结论．

英文摘要：

Considering that large number of real-life games inconsistent with the prediction of Nash equilibrium theory, this article argues that the closed game environment is another potential assumption of Nash equilibri- um, in addition to the assumption of common rationality. Accordingly, this article expands the concept of po- tential players and assumes that the extra gains of deviating-players in an open environment might lead to a new equilibrium different from Nash equilibrium. To illustrate, an example of two-stage iterated prisoner＇ s dilem- ma is introduced and the reason behind the new non-excepted-equilibrium is analyzed. In addition, according to the idea of CAS theory and multi-agent system, a simulation model is adopted to test the hypotheses proposed.