中文摘要：

随着互联网技术的发展，越来越多的厂商采用动态定价的策略，尤其是当厂商面临需求不确定性时．然而，随着这种策略的广泛应用，消费者变得越来越“聪明”．他们会比较厂商在不同阶段实行的不同价格，愿意等待并选择最好的购买时机．通过运用经典的Stackelberg博弈模型和机制设计理论，讨论面对消费者的这种策略行为，厂商如何在确定性和不确定性需求情形下，决定自己的库存和相应的价格．结论表明，厂商可以根据市场上高价值和低价值消费者的构成，通过适当的库存数量和价格设定，增大消费者买不到产品的风险，从而减少消费者的等待行为．文中的理论方法值得相关行业的借鉴和应用．

英文摘要：

With the development of Internet, more and more firms adopt dynamic pricing as a valid method to maximize their profit, especially, when the demand is uncertainty. But on the other hand, the consumers become cleverer than before. Customers behave strategically and weigh their payoff of immediate purchase against the expected payoff of delaying their purchases. In this paper, we use the Stackelberg model and the theory of mechanism design, consider how a monopoly firm should choose his inventory and optimal price under the strategetic customer in a monoply market, we see that via its capacity choice, the firm is able to control the fill rate and hence the rationing risk faced by customers to gain larger profit.