现在的纸从预先改革时期检验中国的农村税收系统的历史的进化到 1990 年代末。因为信息不对称现象在之间,我们建议那上层并且降低水平的政府,政府们不得不被同意一些非正式的税自治完成上层的政策的本地人要求。这容易在农民上导致了过多的本地非正式的税收。当谷物部门的市场自由化进行了,逐渐地通过含蓄的税收的传统的途径实现的便宜的税仪器侵蚀了。当更工业化的区域变了到以税收集是不太昂贵的非农业的税时,在农业区域的本地政府不得不诉诸从单个农村家庭直接收集的非正式的费用。因此,在农民之间的政治紧张和在基于农业的区域的本地政府出现了,农村税改革变得必要。
The present paper examines the historical evolution of China's rural taxation system from the pre-reform period to the late 1990s. We propose that because of information asymmetry between the upper-level and the lower-level governments, local governments had to be granted some informal tax autonomy to fulfill the upper-level policy mandates. This easily led to excessive local informal taxation on farmers. As market liberalization of the grain sectorprogressed, the low-cost tax instruments implemented through the traditional approach of implicit taxation gradually eroded. Local governments in agricultural regions had to resort to informal fees collected directly from individual rural households while the more industrialized regions shifted to non-agricultural taxes that are less costly in terms of tax collection. Hence, political tension between farmers and local governments in agriculturebased regions emerged and rural tax reform became necessary.