中文摘要：

以往有关绿色供应链激励机制的研究主要是围绕制造商为核心企业展开．而2014年12月颁布的《企业绿色采购指南（试行）》强调了采购商（或零售商）在绿色供应链当中所起的作用．以零售商（而不是供应商）作为核心企业，建立供应商一零售商绿色供应链博弈模型，用以研究零售商的激励制度设计以及绿色产品需求如何影响绿色供应链．分别求解供应商不进行绿色工艺研发、供应商单独进行绿色工艺研发的供应链均衡解，并且设计了转移支付激励机制．研究表明：1）供应商和零售商不一定都有激励提高产品绿色度，但在特定条件下，他们都有动力提高产品绿色度；2）如果供应商和零售商都有动力提高产品绿色度，那么供应商主导型的绿色供应链比零售商主导型的供应链在为整个供应链创造利润方面更佳；3）零售商主导型的绿色供应链可找到最优转移支付比例使得供应链整体利润最大化，且转移支付激励手段有效．

英文摘要：

Prior research on green supply chain incentive mechanism considered manufacturer as focal firm. Yet, ＂Guidebook of Green Procurement for Enterprises＂ released on December 2014 emphasized the importance of retailer in the green supply chain. This paper considers retailer, not manufacturer, as a focal firm, builds a supplier-retailer green supply chain game-theoretic model, and uses it to study the design of incentive mechanism and how the demand of green products may affect the design of the green supply chain. We get the equilibrium solutions for cases where there is no R＆D on green technology, R＆D of green technology conducted by manufacturer only, and R＆D of green technology conducted by both manufacturer and retailer. We design a transfer payment incentive mechanism. We find that： （1） The smaller the initial demand of green products, the lower benefits obtained by both manufacturer and retailer from the green technology R＆D; （2） Green technology development should be carried out by the supplier; （3） Transfer payment is an effective incentive mechanism.