我们建议没有随机的神谕, provably 安全的矮组签名(GS ) 计划。我们的基本计划是比在 Eurocrypt 2006 的 Boyen 水 GS 计划短大约 14 倍的,并且 42% 突然由于 Ateniese 比最近的 GS 策划等。安全证明被提供在普遍 Composable 模型,它允许安全的证明有效不仅当我们的计划与其它一起在隔离,而且在作文被执行时,固定密码的原语。我们也介绍几个新计算假设并且在通用的组模型认为他们正当。这些假设在高级协议的设计是有用的并且可能具有独立兴趣。电子增补材料这篇文章(doi:10.1007/s11390-007-9102-y ) 的联机版本包含增补材料,它对授权用户可得到。
We propose short group signature (GS) schemes which are provably secure without random oracles. Our basic scheme is about 14 times shorter than the Boyen-Waters GS scheme at Eurocrypt 2006, and 42% shorter than the recent GS schemes due to Ateniese et al. The security proofs are provided in the Universally Composable model, which allows the proofs of security valid not only when our scheme is executed in isolation, but also in composition with other secure cryptographic primitives. We also present several new computational assumptions and justify them in the generic group model. These assumptions are useful in the design of high-level protocols and may be of independent interest.