中文摘要：

借鉴报酬激励的梯度效应,运用委托代理理论,研究了信息不对称条件第四方物流外包时对第三方物流的激励问题.研究结果表明：第三方物流获得高业绩的可能性越小即任务挑战性越强,第四方物流应该给予其的激励越多;激励梯度使激励契约与任务属性、第三方物流能力与效益以及第四方物流付出的代价密切关联;激励梯度的存在不影响第四方物流努力水平.

英文摘要：

This paper considers the gradient effect of the remuneration incentive.Using the principal-agent theory,this paper researches on the outsourcing incentive mechanism of the fourth party logistics under asymmetric information,and gets the following results：the smaller the possibility for the third party logistics to gain high performance is,namely the more challenging the task is,the more incentive payments the fourth party logistics should give;the gradient effect makes the task property,the capability and the benefits of the third party logistics and the cost paid by the fourth party logistics closely linked;the existence of the incentive gradient does not affect the effort of the fourth party logistics.