中文摘要：

研究期权和回购两种契约下物流服务供应链的协调问题，考虑分包商回购顾客退回和集成商剩余物流能力的问题，在Stackelberg主从博弈下建立了基于期权回购契约的决策模型，得出了集成商的最优初始订购量和分包商的最优物流能力投资额。研究结果表明，期权价、期权执行价格和回购价满足特定条件下可以实现供应链协调。最后通过数值分析得出，随着期权价和回购价的增加，集成商的利润逐渐增加，分包商的利润逐渐减少。选取适当的契约参数可以实现供应链的帕累托改进。

英文摘要：

This paper studied the coordination problem of logistics service supply chain under the joint option contract with buyback contract. Considering the supply chain coordination with the subcontractor bought back customers return and the inte- grator＇ s surplus logistics capacity, it constructed the decision model based on option and buyback contract under Stacketberg leader-follower game, then obtained the optimal order decision of integrator and the optimal logistics capacity investment deci- sion of subcontractor. The research results show that the option price, option exercise price and buyback price to meet certain conditions can realize supply chain coordination. Finally, a numerical example shows that with the increase of option price and buyback price, integrator＇ s expected profit increases and subcontractor＇ s expected profit descends. The supply chain can real- ize pareto improvement by choosing appropriate contract parameters.