中文摘要：

管理层与股东利益冲突极为尖锐的高管变更期间,前后任高管实现自身利益最大化的动机很可能导致财务重述的增加。笔者将管理防御理论纳入高管变更与财务重述关系研究框架,利用我国上市公司2010—2015年高管变更及上年财务重述数据进行实证检验,结果发现：高管变更上年的财务报表更容易被重述,且多是调减利润的财务重述,这一现象主要发生于新任高管为外部继任的公司。进一步检验发现：前后任高管的管理防御强度提高均会加剧财务重述的发生。研究表明,严重影响上市公司信息透明度的财务重述既是高管进行管理防御的结果,也是他们实施管理防御的工具。本研究从财务重述视角检验了高管变更对会计信息质量的影响,揭示出管理防御动机是财务报表更容易被重述的重要内在动因,丰富了公司治理方面的研究成果,同时也为加强会计信息质量监管提高资本市场效率提供了决策参考。

英文摘要：

During the period of executive turnover, where managers and shareholders are in sharp conflict of interests, it may lead to an increase in financial restatement that predecessor and successor executives maximizing their own interests. This paper puts managerial entrenchment theory into research framework of re- lationship between executive turnover and financial restatements, using the data about financial restatement and executive turnover of listed companies during 2010-2015 in China. We empirically examine the above question. Empirical results show that financial statements are more likely to be restated in the year ahead of exe- cutive turnover. Those restatements mostly reduce profits, and this phenomenon occurs mainly in the new ex- ecutives for the external succession of the company. Further testing finds that the increase in the intensity of predecessor and successor executives＇ management entrenchment will exacerbate the occurrence of financial re- statement. This paper shows that financial restatement, which seriously affects the information transparency of listed companies, is closely related to management entrenchment. Financial restatement is both the result and the tool of management entrenchment. Compared with the previous literature, this paper examines the impact of executive turnover on the quality of accounting information from the perspective of financial restatement, re- veals that enhanced managerial entrenchment motivations are the important internal drivers of financial state- ments that are more likely to be restated, which enriches the literatures on corporate governance and also pro- vides practical references for strengthening information quality supervision and improving capital market effi- ciency.