中文摘要：

研究了信息非对称条件下，制造商如何设计相应契约来激励分销商提高服务水平进而最大化制造商自己的利益的问题．给出了信息非对称下的供应链契约设计模型，并计算了信息价值．模型结果表明，分销商销售能力越强，制造商获益越多；并且，制造商收益与分销商销售能力成平方增长关系．同时，还得到在信息非对称情况下，制造商由于信息的缺乏付出了代价，当分销商的销售能力越强时这种情况表现越为明显，信息价值也就越大，制造商收集分销商有关信息的动机也就越强等结论．

英文摘要：

Contracts in distribution channels with asymmetric information are studied, by which suppliers mo- tivate their retailers to improve service quality to sell more. Principal-agent models under asymmetric information are given, and information value is computed. The results show that the supplier could gain more when his retailers＇ sale ability is stronger; furthermore, the supplier＇ s profits are the square of retailer＇ s sales ability. The results also show that suppliers suffer a loss due to lack of information of retailer＇ s service quality, and it is more obvious when the retailers＇ sales ability is stronger. So information value is bigger in this situation, and the motives for suppliers to collect information about retailer＇ s service quality are stronger.