中文摘要：

将电动自行车出行者群体作为一个同质总体,将每一出行者看作是具备有限理性和学习能力的个体,对电动自行车超标问题进行了演化博弈分析.研究表明,当出行方式选择达到演化博弈均衡时,习俗或惯例往往相伴生成;在收益矩阵不变的条件下,只有对于多重均衡才可能发生博弈均衡的转变,这取决于总体的初始状态.在此基础上,对电动自行车超标问题提出了规范和治理措施.运用演化博弈论和制度分析方法研究交通习俗和惯例的生成与演化规律,不仅可以加深对出行行为的理解,也为交通政策的制定和实施提供了理论依据.

英文摘要：

Regarding different electric bicycle travelers as a homogeneous population,and each traveler as an individual with bounded rationality and learning ability,an evolutionary game analysis was given on the exceeding standard problem for electric bicycle.The research shows that when a travel mode choice game comes to an equilibrium,a certain kind of custom or convention will be formed simultaneously,and if the payoff matrix remains invariable,only a game with multiple equilibriums has the possibility to transfer from one equilibrium to another,which depends on the population＇s initial state.Following the above analysis,some control measures were suggested.The application of evolutionary game theory and method of institutional analysis to the study of traffic customs and conventions can not only deepen the understanding of travel behavior,but also provide a theoretical basis for traffic policy formulation and implementation.