中文摘要：

通过剖析央行利用信息披露影响商业银行风险偏好、调节信贷规模的作用机制，揭示了央行信息披露非对称性行为的内在机理。基于2001-2012年36家商业银行面板数据的实证检验支持了以下结论：央行信息披露显著影响了商业银行的风险偏好。二者呈现出高度的正相关关系；信息披露与实际干预共同作用于银行信贷，导致繁荣期和萧条期信贷管理的不一致以及央行信息披露的非对称性。因此，中央银行应当挖掘信息披露与实际干预的配合机理，对二者加以灵活运用，以提高货币政策调控的有效性。

英文摘要：

This paper analyzes the mechanism of the impact of information disclosure of central bank on risk preference of commercial banks and adjustment of credit scale, and reveals the inherent mechanism of asymmetric behavior of information disclosure of central bank. Based on panel data of 36 commercial banks from 2001 to 2012, empirical test supports the view of this article. Firstly, Information disclosure of central bank significantly affects risk preference of commercial banks. Secondly, Information disclosure of central bank and practical intervention affect bank credit in common,leading to the inconsistency in the credit management during a boom with a bust and the asymmetry of information disclosure of central bank. Therefore, central bank should explore the coordinate mechanism between information disclosure and practical intervention, and use flexibly them to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy.