中文摘要：

本文试图透过20世纪90年代金融市场化改革的“海南实验”解读中国金融改革的“市场化悖论”。基于Dewatripoint和Maskin的“逆向选择”模型以及Akelof和Romer的“掠夺型所有者”模型的提示，本文发现，导致中国金融改革“市场化悖论”的要害在于国家试图在保持金融控制的前提下推进金融市场化改革；而依据“市场化”金融企业与国家之间的两期动态博弈模型，这种意在兼顾双重目标的改革政策最终极有可能无功而返。这一分析结论对于目前正在积极推进的国有商业银行的市场化改革不无启示意义。本文随后的引申性讨论表明，由于国家仍然期望继续兼顾金融控制与市场化双重目标，因此国有商业银行改革也会面临“市场化悖论”。

英文摘要：

The paper studies the marketization dilemma facing China＇ s financial reform via Hainan case. Based on the theory of adverse selection and the model of predatory ownership, the paper finds that the main cause resulted in the dilemma is that government desires to deepen the financial reform under the government financial control. Further, according the two-stage dynamic game model between the financial industry and the state, the above dual-targeted-policy followed by government will probably achieve nothing. This conclusion indicates that state-owned commercial banks reform will inevitably fall into the marketization dilemma due to the same dual purposes of the government policy.