对会计稳健性的债务契约解释应包括表现形式和内在机理两个方面:前者是指稳健性的债务契约需求特征:后者则为稳健性的债务契约有用性。本文尝试从需求特征和有用性两方面提供稳健性的债务契约解释在中国证券市场的初步证据。以中国A股1999至2005年的上市公司为样本,本文采用账面市价比法和Basu的方法度量截面会计稳健性,同时采用KhanandWatts构建的C_SCO尺尉旨标度量时间截面的稳健性,考查股东债权人冲突及其缓解与稳健性之间的关系。实证检验表明:当债务契约双方冲突较大时,公司的会计处理更加稳健:会计处理越稳健,公司越可能获得新增贷款。本文既丰富了稳健性的债务契约需求特征的经验证据,更首次直接验证了中国上市公司中稳健性的债务契约有用性。
The debt contracting explanation for accounting conservatism should be discussed in terms of two aspects: the extrinsic form, which refers to the characteristics of debt contracts' need for conservatism, and the intrinsic mechanism, which refers to conservatism's usefulness to debt contracts. This paper provides initial evidence relating to Chinese stock markets about the debt contracting explanation for conservatism in terms of need characteristics and usefulness. Based on sample data of Chinese A-share listed companies collected between 1999 and 2005, we investigate the relationship between accounting conservatism and shareholder-creditor conflicts, as well as the relationship between accounting conservatism and the mitigation of the conflicts. In this paper, we use the book-to-market ratio method and Basu method to measure cross-sectional conservatism, and C_SCORE to measure firm-year conservatism. The empirical results indicate that a higher level of conflicts between debt contracting parties leads to a higher level of conservatism in companies' accounting policy. Moreover, the more conservative the accounting policy, the more incremental loan a company can obtain. Our paper enriches the empirical literature on debt contracts' need for conservatism and provides, for the first time, evidence of the usefulness of conservatism to debt contracts in Chinese listed companies.