中文摘要：

我国的经理人股票期权激励计划一般对期权的行权价格提供股利保护,这对不同股权激励工具选择与公司现金股利政策之间的关系会产生什么影响呢？本文利用2006-2012年间正式实施股权激励计划的A股上市公司的相关数据对此展开实证研究,结果发现,使用限制性股票作为股权激励工具的公司还是比使用股票期权作为股权激励工具的公司现金分红概率更高,现金股利支付水平也更高;进一步的研究表明当公司董事长为限制性股票的激励对象时公司现金股利支付水平显著较高。本文的发现意味着,限制性股票是比股票期权更佳的股权激励工具,能够更好地把经理人利益和股东长远利益捆绑在一起,而激励对象也会影响股权激励计划的效果。

英文摘要：

This paper investigates the choice of equity incentive tools and cash dividends policy under dividend protection. Based on the data of companies who started the equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2012, we find that the companies who use restricted stock as equity incentive tool are more likely to pay cash dividend, who also have significantly higher payout ratio. Furthermore, when the board chairmen are among the executives being granted the restricted stocks, those companies have sig- nificantly higher payout ratio. The findings imply that the incentive effects of restricted stocks is better than the incentive ef- fects of stock options, and the effects would be affected by the executives who are chosen to be granted equity incentives.