中文摘要：

本文运用实物期权方法建立了代理环境下规模经济驱动的企业并购过程的动态模型。结果表明，规模经济驱动的兼并活动与产品市场需求正相关；收购公司管理者较大的控制权私有收益和业绩报酬敏感性使实际的兼并过程更快发生，目标公司管理者较大的私有收益会推迟兼并过程的发生；收购公司在合并企业的所有权份额与收购公司管理者的私有收益负相关，与业绩敏感性正相关。最后，模型还得出了与经验结论较为一致的公告超常收益的变动。

英文摘要：

Using a real option framework, this paper presents a dynamic model of mergers motivated by economies of scale under agency environment. The model shows that mergers motivated by economies of scale are positively related to product market demand. The larger private benefit of control and sensitivity to pay for performance of acquiring firm managers will speed the actually merger process, and the larger private benefit of target firm managers will delay the actually merger process. The ownership share of acquiring firm in the combined firm is negatively related to acquiring firm manager＇s private benefit, and positively related to acquiring firm manager＇ s sensitivity to pay for performance. The model also concludes implications for abnormal returns around merger announcement.