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中文摘要：
针对机会网络中节点自私性问题，结合资源受限的机会网络特性，提出了一种基于买卖模型的节点激励策略——BIP．BIP策略采用货币支付模式，综合考虑节点自身资源、拥有的虚拟货币以及消息属性对消息进行定价，从而激励自私节点合作，同时有效地解决节点盲目合作带来的网络性能退化问题．博弈论分析证明，节点达成交易后，BIP策略可以有效地约束节点参与消息转发．通过仿真实验进一步验证BIP策略的有效性和实用性，结果表明BIP策略降低了能量消耗，减小了时延，提高了交付率．
英文摘要：
Aiming at the selfishness of nodes in opportunistic networks and according to the char- acteristics of opportunistic networks, a bargaining based incentive protocol （BIP） is proposed in this paper. To stimulate selfish nodes to cooperate and solve the network performance degrada- tion resulted from blind cooperation of nodes, BIP designs a money payment mode and prices messages ready to be sent with residual resources and virtual money of nodes and the attributes of messages considered. Through the analysis of game theory, once the deal is made, BIP could bind nodes to participate in the message forwarding process. Simulation results further demonstrate the effectiveness and the practicality of the proposed protocol. From the simulation, BIP can reduce the energy consumption and decrease the delivery delay and increase the delivery ratio.
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