中文摘要：

基于代理成本的视角,分析大股东掏空对经理薪酬激励与盈余管理行为的影响及内在机理,并以2008年至2011年中国沪、深股市A股上市公司数据为样本,采用OLS模型实证检验大股东掏空、经理薪酬与盈余管理间的内在联系,并考察不同产权性质企业大股东掏空对经理薪酬与盈余管理影响的系统性差异。研究结果表明,尽管中国上市公司已基本建立有弹性的业绩型薪酬体系,但是大股东攫取控制权私利的掏空行为也会降低经理薪酬激励的有效性,并引发经理与大股东合谋进行盈余管理的新的代理问题;产权性质对大股东掏空、经理薪酬和盈余管理间关系具有显著的调节作用,与国有上市公司相比,非国有上市公司中掏空行为对经理薪酬业绩敏感性以及经理薪酬与盈余管理间敏感性的影响表现得更加突出。

英文摘要：

Based on the perspective of agency cost, this paper analyzes the internal mechanism of large shareholders＇ tunneling on the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation incentive and earnings management and its underlying mechanism. Subsequently, using the data from China＇s listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2008 to 2011, we conduct OLS models to investigate the relationship among large shareholders＇ tunneling, executive incentive and earnings management, and examine the systematic differences caused by the effects of property features on these relationships. The results indicate that, the China＇s listed companies have already established a market-orientated pay-for-performance system, but large shareholders ＇ tunneling for obtaining private benefits of control can also weaken the effectiveness of executive compensation incen- tive and even trigger new agent problems about earning management canspiracy between large shareholders and top executives. After distinguishing the specimens by property features, we find that, the negative impacts of large shareholders＇ tunneling in private enterprises on the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation incentive, executive compensation and earnings management are significantly stronger than the effects in state-owned enterprises.