基于高管过度自信的视角考量我国上市公司股权激励实施对企业非效率投资行为的影响,结果表明,我国上市公司普遍存在过度投资和投资不足的现象,股权激励能有效抑制过度投资行为,但对企业投资不足现象具有显著的促进作用,同时,高管过度自信会导致企业过度投资行为的发生,相应地会降低投资不足行为的产生;高管过度自信是导致股权激励效果弱化的重要原因,股权激励的实施会在高管过度自信的作用下加剧企业过度投资行为,而对投资不足表现出不显著的抑制效果;良好的公司治理环境能有效抑制高管过度自信概率,也是激励效果得以发挥的重要前提。
From the managers overconfidence perspective,this paper examines China's listed equity incentive effect on corporate investment behavior.The results show that excessive investment and insufficient investment phenomenon generally exist in China's listed companies;equity incentive can effectively inhibit the over investment behavior,but enterprises lack of investment has a significant role in promoting.Managerial overconfidence will lead to over investment behavior of enterprises,the corresponding will reduce the investment problems;managerial overconfidence leads to equity incentive plan of weakening the effectiveness of the important reasons,the implementation of equity incentive will be in the role of managerial overconfidence exacerbated by corporate over investment behavior,and the lack of investment showed no significant inhibitory effect.At the same time,agood corporate governance environment can effectively restrain the probability of the senior executives' confidence,and also is an important precondition for the incentive effect to play.