中文摘要：

服务联盟运作尤其是线上线下服务联盟运作是服务经济时代依托现代信息技术而发展起来的商业模式,其运作模式有别于传统服务运作,质量控制也存在诸多特殊性,传统的服务企业质量控制和供应链联盟质量控制方法不再适用。通过对初级的、整合线上线下服务联盟运作特征的、考虑前景展望理论的3个层级质量激励模型的比较分析后发现,代理企业的直接质量收益和前景理论必须被考虑到联盟运作的质量激励机制中。研究结果显示：核心企业在服务联盟运作中,除了根据相关指标构建正面激励机制外,负面激励机制更为有效,具体包括构建质量懈怠信息的获取渠道和提高惩罚系数;线上核心企业委托给线下代理企业顾客规模的合理确定是质量激励机制乃至联盟服务运作能否成功的关键。

英文摘要：

In service oriented era,online-offline service enterprises alliance is becoming more and more popular because of the development of modern information technologies.Service operation in alliance is different from service operation in a single enterprise,just because there are different delivers in a single process of service delivery.Correspondingly,how to control service quality is very difficult as well as important in the alliance.Quality control in online-offline service enterprises alliance is different from an individual service enterprise or a product supply chain alliance.We first construct a primary quality incentives model based on Principal-Agent theory.Then the characteristics of service operation in online-offline service enterprises alliance have been integrated into the primary model to establish the second model.Based on that,we further take the prospect theory into consideration,which yields the last quality incentives model.After analyzing the three different models and comparing the corresponding incentives coefficients,we find that both the direct quality revenue of the agent and the prospect theory should be considered as formulating the quality incentives mechanism.This study shows that the quality incentives should include not only the positive incentives,but also the negative incentives.To be more specifically speaking,the positivequality incentives mechanism includes the determining incentives coefficients in the revised quality incentives model,while the way to acquire information about the quality effort of agent service enterprises and corresponding penalty coefficient can be captured by the negative quality incentives mechanism.Appropriate measurement of the scale of customers that the core service enterprise consigns to the agent is critical to the success of quality incentives mechanism designs.At last,some practices in service industries are proposed to verify the research result.