中文摘要：

从会计准则变更的角度，我们探讨了审计质量对管理层迎合分析师预测的影响，进而揭示审计师、管理层和制度环境三者之间的关系。运用2004—2012年度中国A股上市公司数据，研究发现管理层通过盈余管理迎合分析师预测，高质量的审计能够抑制该行为，但是2007年会计准则变更减弱了审计质量与管理层迎合程度的负向关系。研究结果表明：迎合分析师预测是管理层盈余管理的重要动机之一，审计师能够对管理层这种机会主义行为产生监督效应，但是会计制度的变迁则可能削弱了审计师的作用。因此，在加强对管理层迎合行为监管的同时，相关利益方应适时改进会计准则和审计技术方法体系，以保证资本市场良好的信息环境。

英文摘要：

This paper discusses the effect of audit quality on the management meeting or beating analyst expectations （MBAE） from the perspective of accounting standards changing,which reveals the relationship among analyst, man- agement and institutional environment. Using China A-share listed company data from 2004 to 2012, this paper finds that management will meet or beat analyst expectations through earnings manipulation, while high-quality audi- ting may inhabit this behaviour. When accounting standards changed in 2007, the negative correlation between audit quality and MBAE has been reduced. The results show that MBAE is an important motivation for the earnings man- agement,auditors really play an important role in inhibiting such opportunistic behavior, but changes of accounting systems may weaken the role of the auditor. Therefore, in order to guarantee a good information environment of cap- ital market, the regulator may strengthen the supervision of MBAE and the stakeholders should timely improve the accounting standards and auditing technology system.