中文摘要：

以手工搜集单笔银行借款契约信息,研究企业社会责任信息披露能否有效降低信息不对称,进而作用于银行借款契约。研究发现,相对于未披露社会责任信息的公司,披露公司获得的银行借款利率较低、期限较长、金额较大;在披露社会责任信息的公司中,社会责任信息披露越好,企业所获得的银行借款越优惠。进一步研究发现,这一关系仅在民营企业和上市时间较短的企业中保持。这表明自愿信息披露有助于优化市场信贷环境,能够为企业获取银行信贷资源提供一条思路,同时为证监会制定相关披露准则提供经验证据。

英文摘要：

Information asymmetry affects bank risk assessment of the enterprise,and then brings influence on the loan contract. This paper uses individual bank loan contract data to test whether the corporate social responsibility information disclosure can reduce the information asymmetry effectively and then influence bank loan contract. The results find that compared with the company which does not disclose CSR information,the company which discloses information can get more favorable bank loan contracts（ with lower interest rates,longer duration and larger amounts）. What ＇s more,the quality of CSR disclosure is negatively correlated with interest rate,and positively correlated with loan term and amount.Further study finds that this phenomenon is more pronounced in private enterprises and those enterprises which have been listed only for a relatively short period of time. The conclusion shows that voluntary information disclosure not only optimizes the credit market environment,but also provides empirical evidence for CSRC to strengthen the guidelines on voluntary information disclosure.