从博弈双方有限理性的假设前提出发,在研究纯市场行为产学研协同创新的基础上,引入政府行为,构建政产学研协同创新的演化博弈模型,通过数值模拟描述了具体的演化路径及影响因素。政产学研协同创新的初始状态影响系统演化的方向及速度,系统演化具有明显的“路径依赖”特征,协同创新的投入成本、额外收益、政策支持力度及惩罚机制等对演化路径产生重大影响。政产学研协同创新的演化动力来自系统内部的竞争与合作关系。竞争使系统不断趋于非平衡,是系统演化的首要条件;合作关系则使政产学研协同创新的某些趋势联合起来并加以放大,支配着政产学研协同创新系统的整体演化。建议政府从建立合理的创新利益分配机制,完善创新风险分摊机制,优化职能等方面促进政产学研协同创新的有效实施。
An evolutionary game model of "government-industry-university-institute" cooperative innovation was established based on the limited rational hypothesis. The government behavior was introduced into the innovation model under the condition of pure mar- ket behaviors in this thesis. The influence factors and detailed evolutionary path of the model were described by numerical simulation method. The evolution direction and speed of the system will be influenced by the initial state. The "path dependence" character will be obvious for system evolution. Many factors will lead to a significant influence on evolutionary path, such as input cost, extra in- come, policy support, punishment mechanism and so on. The driving force of the system was the relationship of internal competition and cooperation. Competition makes the system become unbalanced, which is the primary condition for system evolution, but coopera- tion relationship makes the certain trend of the innovation unite and enlarge, dominating its overall evolution. The government shall en- courage "government-industry-university-institute" cooperative innovation through various channels, such as interest distribution mech- anism, risk sharing mechanism, government function optimization and so on.