中文摘要：

文章从高管薪酬的权力决定论出发,利用2009-2014年我国16家上市银行96份样本数据对我国金融机构薪酬管制的＂过程有效性＂进行实证研究,结果发现：无论是否隶属中央直管银行,高管权力越大,高管货币薪酬、在职消费水平都越低,且在中央直管银行中更明显。这种＂金融机构薪酬管制异象＂虽然反映了银行高管能够利用自身权力调减薪酬来迎合政府薪酬管制目标,但也从侧面提供了银行高管在政府薪酬管制过程中仍可以继续影响薪酬制定的证据,薪酬管制缺乏过程有效性。

英文摘要：

This article utilizes 96 samples of data from China＇s 16 listed banks（2009-2014）and empirically tests the effects of the policy and regulations that our government has promulgated to regulate executive compensation of financial institutions since 2009. The results show that the greater the executive power is, the lower the executive monetary compensation and perquisite consumption is, whether or not the bank is directly managed by the central government. The ＂financial institutions pay regulation vision＂reflects that, although the bank executives can use their power to reduce pay to cater to the government compensation regulation target, the bank executives can continue to develop on the evidence of the compensation under the government compensation regulation. Therefore, the compensation regulation lacks process effectiveness.