中文摘要：

本文研究了家族成员高管（定义为与控制人存在血缘关系的高管）与非家族成员高管的薪酬契约差异及其对企业未来业绩的影响。研究结果表明，相比非家族成员高管，家族成员高管能够获得更高的现金薪酬，然而家族成员高管获取的超额薪酬对企业未来会计业绩和市场业绩均存在显著的负面影响。进一步研究显示，家族成员高管的超额薪酬现象在家族成员参与董事会比例较高的企业中更显著。此外，薪酬一业绩敏感度和股权激励等非现金薪酬在家族成员高管和非家族成员高管之间没有显著差异，表明家族成员高管的超额薪酬水平并非由薪酬一业绩敏感度差异或者不同的股权激励水平所致。综合上述发现，我们认为家族成员高管的超额薪酬给家族企业的业绩带来负面影响，不利于家族企业的长远发展。

英文摘要：

Family firm have become one important component of Chinese economy. Although surveys show that most of family firms could not survive for long time due to family-tie management, there are limited academic evidences showing specifically how family-tie affects business decisions and activities. Using the sample of Chinese listed family firms, this study investigates into the situations on how family-tie affect management compensation schemes in family firms. In particular, we examine the difference between compensation contract of family managers （defined as managers that have blood-re- lationship with firm owner） and non-family managers, and how this difference affects firm future performance. We first collect the back- ground information of all managers of family firms from IPO pros- pects. Based on this information, we could separate family managers from non-family managers. The empirical results show that family managers＇ cash compensation is significantly higher than that of non-family managers, especially for non-CEO positions. The excess pay of family managers versus non-family managers has a negative influence on firm three-year long-term accounting and capital market performance. Our further investigation shows that the excess pay of family managers is more pronounced when there are more family directors serve in board. In addition, the results show that there is no significant difference in terms of pay-performance sensitivity and/or stock option compensation between family managers and non-family managers. This suggests that the difference of cash compensation is not related to pressure difference from incentive pay schemes. Taken together, the above-mentioned findings indicate that the excess cash compensation of family managers is a form of agency problem due to family ownership structure and is harmful for firms＇ long-term de- velopment. Our study contributes to literature of family firm by pro- viding specific empirical evidences on problems caused by family-tie management. Our results have p